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1. Introduction 
 
This paper argues that self-assessment might help pupils to put more effort in education and 
therefore could influence educational transitions. It is found that self-assessment positively 
influences the choice of college-bound secondary tracks especially among pupils with less 
advantageous parental background. Depending on self-assessment, the gap declines in 
secondary school track choice between the children of low- and high-educated parents. These 
are important findings, since if pupils remain in education until they reach the educational 
level of their parents, then the offspring of low-educated couples would prefer to choose 
vocational tracks, from where there is no direct access to tertiary education. Hence, self-
assessment might help pupils with disadvantageous parental backgrounds to reach their 
potentials and also might block the reproduction of educational inequalities.  
The trade-off between the perception of ability and actual ability (Sjögren and 
Sällström, 2004) and the role of self-perceived ability in educational decisions (Guo et al., 
2015; Musu-Gillette et al., 2015) have been widely researched themes. They are also 
embedded theoretically in sociology (Breen, 1999) and social psychology (Eccles, 1983; 
Wigfield et al., 2006). Much less attention has been devoted to how self-perceived ability 
mediates and/or moderates (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Brambor et al., 2005) existing parental 
background differences in educational track choices. In this regard there is a need to fill this 
gap and investigate how educational decisions are modified depending on pupils’ perceptions 
about their own abilities. This paper aims to build on previous research about educational 
decisions and inequality in educational opportunities (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997) on the one 
hand, and on research about academic self-concept (Wigfield and Eccles, 2000; Wigfield et 
al., 2006) as the major concept of expectancy-value theory in education (Eccles, 1983) on the 
other hand.  
The research claims that perception of own ability (self-assessment) might precede 
pupils’ interpretations of success. If pupils self-perceive their abilities to be high, they might 
make more of an effort in education, since pupils who believe this are more likely to be 
assured of the future success of their costly investment in the present than if they believe that 
their abilities are insufficient (Azmat and Iriberri 2010). Based on Breen (1999) it will also be 
argued that social classes are different in their interpretation of the role of effort in education. 
Children in lower-order classes are much more likely to believe that effort is not important, 
and therefore these pupils will also invest less effort at school than their peers with a more 
advantageous parental background. Throughout the paper, I will argue therefore that (1) self-
assessment regulates the amount of effort somebody invests in education. Since more effort 
might translate into higher transition probability, self-assessment ultimately contributes to 
transitions to more competitive and knowledge intensive tracks. Furthermore I claim that (2) 
self-assessment differs according to parental background since the low-educated families tend 
to overemphasise the impact of ability relative to effort in education.  
The paper finds significant parental background differences in pupils’ self-perceived 
abilities. It will also be revealed that self-assessment has an independent role to play in 
educational track choices, but does not mediate parental background differences in the choice 
of educational track. Nonetheless, the paper demonstrates that self-assessment might 
moderate the parental education gap in educational transitions. Self-assessment does have an 
especially significant impact in the track choice of pupils with less-educated parents in 
embarking on a secondary track that opens doors to tertiary education. For this reason it could 
be argued that from the little acorn of self-assessment, mighty oaks of rewards may grow. 
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1.1. Status differences in educational decisions: rational choice theory 
 
Rational choice theory is one of several theoretical frameworks used to understand 
inequalities in educational opportunities (Stocké et al., 2011). Its relative importance among 
the other theories arose after Boudon’s (1974) seminal work, in which he explained that the 
impact of social background also manifests itself in the form of different educational 
decisions made at the same level of ability. Since then, more research has examined why it is 
that pupils from different social classes make different educational decisions, even if their 
abilities are the same. Distinguishing primary factors from those that are left once ability is 
controlled for (secondary effects) is clearly one important vein of educational inequality 
research (Jackson, 2013; Karlson and Holm, 2011). 
Class differences in educational decisions emerge because social classes are different in 
at least three characteristics: risk aversion, expectation of success and resources (Breen and 
Goldthorpe, 1997; Esser, 1999). Relative risk aversion means that people in every social class 
strive to maintain the same status at least from an intergenerational perspective. Individuals 
believe that by reaching a particular educational threshold, they will maintain the same social 
class position as their parents. Social classes also differ in terms of ability and interpretation 
of success. Higher social classes have higher-level ability. Furthermore differences in ability 
are believed to capture differences in the subjective estimation of success, if pupils derive 
self-belief from previous success, and if previous failure destroys optimism for success. This 
also means that pupils in lower social groups should have a greater assurance of success if 
they choose the same educational outcomes as their peers in more advantaged social classes. 
Lastly, social classes have different levels of resources, in terms of direct material resources 
(to buy textbooks, pay tuition fees) and the tolerance of opportunity costs in the form of 
forgone earnings and benefits. 
Empirical analysis has mainly focused on the risk-aversion component of this model 
(Davies et al., 2002). Need and de Jong (2000) investigated the decision of pupils to go on to 
tertiary education, using Dutch panel data. They found that educational choice is highly 
determined by the educational aspirations (the desired degree) of pupils – even after 
controlling for grade point average. The offspring of better-educated parents had higher 
aspirations, which was interpreted as a sign of striving to avoid the risk of downward 
mobility. Obermeier and Schneider (2015) used data from the German Socioeconomic Panel 
Study and distinguished between structural (a family’s social status) and individual (personal 
willingness to avoid risk) risk aversion. Based on their findings – after controlling for grade 
point average and disposable family income – students in upper social classes are structurally 
almost compelled to choose academically oriented educational courses. Working-class 
children, however, have more ‘freedom’ in this choice, which is also influenced by individual 
risk aversion. Explaining schooling ambitions, van de Werfhorst and Hofstede (2007) have 
similar results, finding relative risk aversion to be a relevant factor in the explanation.  
Status gap in educational decisions might be explained however also by status 
differences in ability and interpretation of success. Focusing on that topic, new questions 
might be raised concerning the theoretical difference between ability and its perception 
(Blumenfeld, et al., 1982).  
1.2. From perceived probability of educational success to self-perception of abilities 
 
Actual ability and the interpretation of own educational prospects do not necessarily 
correspond each other, even though the knowledge of own ability shapes the subjective 
probability that pupils attach to being successful at the next stage of education (Breen and 
Goldthorpe, 1997: 285). Prior research interestingly focused more on the subjectively 
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estimated part of individual success probability, while, to the best of my knowledge, the 
perception of own ability received little attention. There is a strand of previous analysis 
showing that, even after controlling for ability, educational decisions can be explained by (a) 
parents’ estimations about their children’s probability of success (Stocké, 2007), (b) 
adolescents’ perception of the probability of success (Keller and Neidhöfer, 2014; Tolsmaet 
al., 2010), and (c) subjective ability measured according to the level of education that pupils 
think they can achieve (Need and de Jong, 2000).  
However, the way in which pupils judge their own ability could be connected to the way 
in which they regard themselves. In social and psychological research, self-esteem – i.e. the 
success achieved by a person, relative to that person’s expectations of himself (James, 1890: 
310) – is considered to offer protection against psychological or physical stress arising from 
the fear of performing badly (Himmler and Koenig, 2012). Its positive impact on educational 
outcomes (Heckman et al., 2006) is challenged by the findings of Himmler and Koenig. Self-
efficacy, on the other hand, influences learning activities via such self-regulatory processes as 
setting goals (Zimmerman, 2000: 87). As people engage in tasks where they think they will 
succeed, self-efficacy is shown to influence the choice of career or university majors 
(empirical evidence is summarized by Pajares, 1996). 
Leaving aside social status differences, expectancy-value theory also focuses on how 
individuals’ beliefs predict academic outcomes (Wigfield and Eccles, 2000). It is argued that 
academic outcomes and choices are mainly determined by skill-related and goal-related 
expectations or perceptions (Eccles, 2009). More importantly for this argumentation, this 
theory claims that the way in which pupils think about their abilities (academic self-concept) 
influences their educational decisions. Applying this theory to empirical research, several 
analyses have revealed the role of self-concept in educational decisions (Musu-Gillette et al., 
2015; Guo et al., 2015; Jackson, 2003) or intention (Nagy et al., 2006). 
Prior research, however, is more reluctant to specify the causal mechanisms for why 
perception of ability might be important in educational decisions. According to my reading of 
prior literature, two causal mechanisms seem paramount. First, underestimated ability could 
act as a self-fulfilling prophecy and get in the way of pupils opting for knowledge-intensive 
education (Sjögren and Sällström, 2004), simply because they do not dare to strive for better 
school qualifications, which they could easily attain if they only tried. Overestimated ability, 
on the other hand might increase the probability of failure. Despite this risk, however, as 
Filippin and Paccagnella (2011) showed in their model, those who initially overestimate their 
abilities will follow more ambitious educational roads if they have access to a greater volume 
of knowledge. The increase in knowledge accumulated will be translated into a widening of 
the gap in human capital between those with and without self-confidence.  
Secondly, a higher perception of own ability might contribute to the choice of the 
optimal level of effort. Since school performance is a combination of ability and effort, and 
since effort is costly and has only an uncertain future payoff, if pupils perceive themselves to 
be ahead of others, this self-perception might lead them to put in more effort, because they are 
assured that it will be worthwhile (Azmat and Iriberri, 2010). In other words, those with 
higher self-assessment might invest more current effort (preparing for the lessons, doing 
homework) than those who think that these efforts are meaningless, since the costly 
investments are anyway inadequate because of their lack of ability. 
Even though there is ample research to demonstrate that self-perception – and more 
particularly academic self-concept – does contribute to educational outcomes, much less 
evidence has been gathered about its status profile. In particular, more information is needed 
about why parental background differences might prevail in self-assessment.  
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1.3. Why status differences in perceived ability might exist 
 
Breen (1999) argues that social differences in subjective probability might exist because 
various status groups have different information about the educational system; moreover, in 
determining success at school, they estimate the role of effort and ability differently. 
Working-class pupils ascribe lower belief to the role of effort than do their peers in the middle 
class, and therefore they are more pessimistic about the prospects of success (Breen, 1999: 
471). Lucas (2009) also claims that ‘myopia’ – the mismatch between subjective estimations 
and actual chances of success – has more unpleasant consequences for pupils of low status 
than for their high-status peers, since the parents of high-status pupils strive to afford any kind 
of help required to maintain the positions of advantage, and this could compensate for pupils 
not having appropriate information about their own abilities and possibilities.  
On the other hand, empirical research reinforces the idea that families in different social 
strata employ different parenting styles, which could influence the transmission of personality 
traits and, through personality, educational outcomes (Kaiser and Diewald, 2014). Parenting 
style is also known to have a direct effect on adolescents’ school achievement (Carolan and 
Wasserman, 2015; Spera, 2005) and is demonstrated to be different according to social status 
(Hoff et al., 2002). Baker and Stevenson (1986) found that mothers with higher 
socioeconomic status were more likely to have accurate knowledge of their child’s schooling, 
to have had contact with the school, and to have employed different strategies to help their 
children in their school-related duties. Poorly educated mothers, on the other hand, have less 
interest in the schooling progress of their children. Other research reinforces the notion that, 
unlike children in working-class and poor families, middle-class children are deliberately 
stimulated by their parents in order to foster their cognitive and social skills (Lareau, 2003). 
Dufur, Parcel and Troutman (2013) showed that ‘home capital’ – assessed as the frequency of 
parent–child discussion of school activities and the frequency with which parents check 
homework – significantly increases academic achievement (measured by test scores in maths, 
reading literacy and science). 
If parents of different social status employ different parenting styles and have different 
information about the role of ability and effort in education, it could be assumed that these 
differences modify the way in which pupils in different families interpret their own abilities. 
Since low-status pupils and their parents overstate the importance of ability and downgrade 
the role of effort in education (Breen, 1999), lower self-assessment is hypothesized among 
pupils in lower strata. This argumentation seems to be supported by Sullivan (2006), who 
reports a survey in which pupils in England were asked to predict the outcome of their GCSE 
exam a couple of months before they actually sat it. A comparison of the estimates with the 
actual results showed that pupils from lower classes systematically underestimated their 
ability, compared to their more advantaged peers. Since only a month or so elapsed between 
the measurement of self-assessed and real performance, reverse causation (working-class 
pupils making more rapid progress) could be excluded. 
Summing up the scholarship of prior research, self-assessment is likely to be influenced 
by parental background (Breen, 1999; Sullivan, 2006) and it might have a role in educational 
decisions (Guo et al., 2015; Musu-Gillette et al., 2015). Still more research is needed to 
understand how self-assessed abilities mediate and/or moderate existing status-related 
differences in educational track choice.  
 
1.4. The purpose of the analysis 
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This paper broadens understanding of educational transitions by distinguishing actual ability 
(school grade or test points) from perceived ability. Even though these two concepts are 
naturally correlated, they could both contribute individually to future school track choice. 
While the consequences of status-related differences in ability are well known in educational 
decision-making, much less attention has been devoted to the same differences in perceived 
ability, especially in connection with later educational outcomes. The analysis therefore will 
delve more deeply into this.  
Our knowledge in terms of status-related educational transitions will be expanded by 
providing empirical evidence on the following three questions: 
1. What kinds of factors mediate parental background differences in perceived 
ability (self-assessment)?  
2. How does self-assessment mediate parental background differences in 
educational transitions? 
3. How does self-assessment moderate the parental education gap in educational 
transitions? 
2. Material and methods 
 
2.1. Data 
 
The data are derived from the Hungarian Life Course Survey (HLCS) – an individual panel 
survey conducted by TÁRKI Social Research Institute on a yearly basis – from the academic 
year 2006/07, with an initial sample of 10,022 largely 14–15-year-old individuals at the 
beginning of year 9 (the 1st wave was organized in autumn 2006). Currently the survey has 
six completed waves with fairly large response rates (2nd wave in 2007: N=9,000; 3rd wave 
in 2008: N=8,648; 4th wave in 2009: N=8,110; 5th wave in 2011: N=8,825; 6th wave in 
2012: N=7,092).  
The HLCS practically follows one single school cohort – those who begun year 9 in the 
academic year of 2006/07 – throughout their secondary education (which usually lasts for four 
years in Hungary). The last two waves also have information about tertiary education or 
labour market entry. The questionnaire contains detailed questions on family background, 
ethnicity and school achievement, as well as many other dimensions, including the attitudes 
and values of the respondents. The survey is, however, individual based, which means that the 
HLCS does not provide information on all the classmates of the respondents. 
The HLCS can be merged with the National Assessment of Basic Competencies 
(NABC), which provides information about the year 8 (from academic year 2005/06) reading 
and maths competency of the same pupils, assessed using a PISA-like test. The NABC 
contains administrative data about the entire school cohort, and therefore the researcher is 
able to glean information about competence test scores, school grades and family background 
for all the year 8 classmates of those who are sampled in the HLCS. The competence test 
itself is centralized: it is developed and run by the Hungarian Educational Authority and 
assesses Hungarian pupils using the same instrument across the country.  
The sample in the analysis contains data on those who began secondary school in 
2006/07. This means that those pupils are analysed from HLCS who did not drop out at the 
end of year 8 and did not choose the early secondary track (discussed in section 2.2 below) 
after year 4 or year 6. Pupils with special educational needs are also excluded, because they 
are oversampled in HLCS and have only reading test scores available. 
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2.2. The Hungarian educational system 
 
Hungary has basically an 8+4 year compulsory education,
1
 where eight years of primary 
education (ISCED 1 and 2) are followed by four (sometimes five, with a special language 
year at the beginning) years of secondary education. There are three different educational 
tracks at the secondary level: (a) vocational track – ISCED 3C, (b) secondary general track 
also called as grammar schools, and (c) a mixed version called ‘secondary vocational track’. 
The general secondary and secondary vocational tracks are equivalent, with an ISCED 3A 
level. In the case of these two types of secondary tracks, the curriculum ends with a school-
leaving certificate also called as A-level (érettségi), which is a necessary requirement to enter 
tertiary education (university or college). Henceforth, the term ‘college-bound secondary 
tracks’ (középiskola) will be used as a generic term for secondary general and secondary 
vocational tracks. More detailed information is available in Bukodi et al. (2008) and also in 
Figure A1 of the Appendix, which provides a schematic overview of the Hungarian school 
system. 
The empirical analysis focuses on two educational transitions: the transition to 
secondary education, and the transition to tertiary education. These are not the first 
educational choices that a pupil makes in his or her life; thus educational decisions analysed 
in this paper are already consequences of previous decisions. The reason for focusing even on 
these choices is that supposedly the transition to secondary education is the first educational 
decision where pupils themselves have a say (rather than just their parents). The vast majority 
of adolescents in the sample (nearly 75 per cent) reported that they made the decision about 
secondary school (at age 14) alone.  
The educational transition analysed first in this paper occurs when pupils are 14–15 
years old and are in the last year of primary education (which usually lasts eight years). At the 
beginning of the second semester, they draw up an order of preference for the secondary 
school they would like to attend (Figure A2 in Appendix shows how these events are 
connected to the timing of HLCS). With the choice of a particular secondary school pupils 
also opted for a particular track. Pupils are admitted to secondary school on the basis of their 
preference ordering and their results in the admission test and/or school marks. As mentioned 
above, there are three tracks available at the secondary level: secondary general (gimnázium) 
and secondary vocational (szakközépiskola) tracks and a vocational track (szakiskola).  
The second educational transition analysed here occurs after the completion of 
compulsory education: whether or not pupils go on to tertiary education (college or 
university). In Hungary, there are no general tuition fees for tertiary education: there is a dual 
system in operation, under which some students pay tuition fees, while others do not. But the 
vast majority of students study free of charge. The first degree is financed by the state 
(according to a quota determined annually by the government) in the case of those who 
achieve an adequate standard in the entrance examination. This regulation basically means 
that approximately every second applicant can study free of charge at university level.
2
  
 
2.3. Definitions 
 
                                                 
1
 Pupils also have the opportunity to enter secondary general school after year 4 or year 6. This means that 
besides the 8+4 template, 4+8 and 6+6 systems are also in operation. The majority of pupils, however, go on to 
secondary school after year 8. Usually talented high-status pupils choose the early track. This selection could 
therefore bias the estimations. 
2
 http://www.felvi.hu/felveteli/ponthatarok_rangsorok/elmult_evek/!ElmultEvek/elmult_evek.php?stat=4 
8 
 
2.3.1. Educational tracks at secondary level 
 
The secondary track was defined on the basis of the path that pupils are following at the 
beginning of year 9 (three possible categories), using HLCS data and as reported by parents. 
In the empirical analysis, two dummy variables will be employed. The first is coded 1 if 
someone has been admitted to a college-bound secondary track (secondary general or 
secondary vocational tracks – the schools from which there is potential access to tertiary 
education) and 0 if someone is at the vocational track. The second dependent variable deals 
with the difference between secondary general track (coded 1) and secondary vocational track 
(coded 0). The reason for using binary categories rather than multinomial is that the choice 
between general and vocational secondary track is a horizontal decision, while the choice 
between the vocational track and the college-bound secondary tracks is vertical.
3
  
 
2.3.2. Educational tracks at tertiary level 
 
Tertiary education is defined on the basis of pupils’ answers in HLCS about the type of 
tertiary education (college or university) they are enrolled in. Those who have actually been 
admitted to state-financed tertiary education (coded 1) are compared to those who had the 
opportunity to go on to such education – i.e. sat the school-leaving certificate – or who 
entered fee-paying tertiary education (coded 0). Fee-paying university places usually have 
lower requirements: pupils are admitted with worse admission tests or school marks; 
moreover, applications to such places are strongly related to social status.  
Note that the population in the case of tertiary education is restricted to those who 
passed their school-leaving certificate (érettségi) and completed their secondary education 
within five years of commencing it (there are no data about respondents later; HLCS has six 
completed waves). Pupils could be enrolled in tertiary education in the year of their school-
leaving certificate, or one year after. This shortcoming of the HLCS could result in right-
censored data. 
Please also note, that the tracks both at secondary and tertiary level are those where 
pupils had been admitted, and not those which had been applied. It could be that pupils 
applied schools within a given track but they had been not admitted to (see section 2.2). The 
impact of self-assessment on application is analysed in a different paper (Keller 2016). 
 
2.3.3. Parent’s highest school qualification 
 
Inspired by Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) prior analyses measured social status by parental 
occupation. Occupational status, however, was neither available in HLCS nor in NABC. 
Therefore the focus is limited here to parental education, which is also a frequently used 
indicator of social origin. However, in recognition of the fact that parental education is not 
equivalent to social-class position, the differences to be found according to parental 
background will be referred to as status-related (not simply status) differences, indicating that 
the variation is not necessarily attributable to social status.  
Parental background is defined by the parents’ (biological or step) highest level of 
education. Two categories are distinguished. Those parents who completed only primary 
education or finished vocational track will be referred to as low-educated parents. Those 
parents who graduated from college-bound secondary tracks (see Figure A1) and have a 
school-leaving certificate or also have a tertiary degree are called high-educated parents. As 
                                                 
3
 Results are consistent using multinomial logit; results are available from the author on request.  
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Holm and Jæger (2008) showed, in many cases pupils are only encouraged to study until they 
reach the educational level of their parent(s). The school-leaving certificate seems to be a 
dividing line. The offspring of parents without a school-leaving certificate might be more 
likely to choose the vocational school track, from which there is no direct entry to tertiary 
education. 
If both the mother’s and the father’s educational levels were available, and if they were 
not the same, the higher of the educational levels was used.
4
 Educational level was reported 
by the parents themselves in HLCS. This reveals larger parental background differences in 
achievement than if children report their parents’ educational level (Jerrim and Micklewright, 
2014) 
Table 1 contains the mean, standard deviation and the number of observations (N) for 
the three dependent variables in the analysis. For example, on average almost 74% of pupils 
follow the college-bound secondary track (Panel C). Some 58% of those whose parents are 
low-educated (Panel A) but 88% of those with high-educated parents (Panel B). Similar 
differences are established on the other two dependent variables (21% versus 46% in the case 
of secondary general school, and 17% and 40% in the case of tertiary education. Explaining 
these gaps more carefully is the aim of the empirical analysis below. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
2.3.4. Self-assessment 
 
Self-assessment is measured using the following question: ‘What do you think your score 
would be in a test in your year 8 class where the total available score is 100 and the average in 
your class is 70?’ Note that the wording of the question indicates the hypothetical class 
average (70 points). Contrary to prior research (Alicke and Govorun 2005; Williams and 
Gilovich 2008), the above described question gives pupils information about the class average 
performance. This has at least three important consequences. It makes (1) the answers 
comparable between schools since the average class performance (70 points) is the same in 
classrooms with good and bad achievement. Furthermore (2) the clear reference points help 
pupils to grasp the meaning of ‘average’ performance, which would be hard to figure out 
otherwise (Dunning, Meyerowitz, and Holzberg 1989). Lastly (3) self-assessment depends 
only on the interpretation of own ability and it is not connected to the perception of class-
mates’ performance.  
Answering the self-assessment question pupils had to indicate a number ranging from 0 
to 100. The average score in the sample is nearly 60 points. This means that pupils interpreted 
their own performance on average below the stated class average (70 points). This is 
somewhat surprising, because prior studies (Alicke and Govorun 2005) claim that people tend 
to believe that they are above average. It is likely, however, that giving pupils clear reference 
about the average performance explains this underestimation, since in prior studies (Dunning 
et al. 1989) the average performance was not given. The standard deviation in the answers is 
about 20 points. In the analysis, however, the self-assessment measure is standardized with a 
0 mean and one unit standard deviation.  
Note, that this question refers to performance in year 8, and so is a kind of retrospective 
question (it was asked in the first wave of HLCS, when students had already begun year 9). 
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the wording of the question does not suggest the type of 
test. One can only guess that the test mentioned in the question probably measures some 
cognitive ability (rather than talent in sport, art, etc.), since pupils usually do not have test in 
                                                 
4
 Results are robust to use of other kinds of definition, such as only mother’s or only father’s educational level.  
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these subjects. A more detailed and domain-specific self-concept measure (used, for example, 
by Musu-Gillette et al., 2015) was not available in the survey. Obviously the question 
measures self-assessment with noise, but this is the only available proxy for that in the 
dataset. 
In an ideal situation, self-assessment should be measured before pupils transitioned 
from primary to secondary education. Since the wording of the self-assessment refers to year 
8 performance, if the question were not asked retrospectively, the causality assumption would 
hold – simply because of the temporal ordering between cause and effect. As things stand, 
however, reverse causality might be a factor: something could have altered pupils’ 
perceptions, and under this influence their estimated abilities might be biased. The bias could 
be connected to the way in which pupils were allocated to different secondary schools. 
Note that pupils enter secondary education on the basis of the order of preference they 
indicate on their application form, and on the basis of their results in the admission test. 
Usually pupils rank better schools higher on their order of preference. It should also be noted 
that usually more competitive schools prescribe an ability test, and schools without a good 
reputation cannot select pupils.  
It is quite reasonable to assume that those who did not get into their first-preference 
school downgraded their year 8 performance retrospectively. Moreover, those who were 
admitted to a competitive secondary school could have upgraded their self-assessment 
retrospectively. The same is true in the opposite direction for those who were admitted to a 
weak secondary school. 
It is not easy to deal with reverse causality in the case of track choices at the secondary 
level, since the bias in self-assessment is likely to be connected to the secondary school 
somebody has entered. Even introducing secondary-school fixed effects (as is done) would be 
a classification based on the dependent variable and therefore would not capture the 
substantive choice process. Nonetheless, it is hard to find an instrumental variable which 
influences only self-assessment and not track choice. Therefore the impact of self-assessment 
in models fitted to secondary track choice is likely to be overestimated and not causal. 
However, in the case of the choice to go on to tertiary education, the retrospective nature of 
self-assessment probably will not bias the estimations. 
 
2.3.5. Ability 
 
Ability or academic/school performance is measured by school marks and by standardized 
test scores in mathematics and reading literacy. Test scores might be a more objective 
measure of ability, since it is assessed by means of a centralized test which is corrected by 
external examiners who do not know the pupils personally. At the same time school marks 
might be more sensitive to teachers’ evaluation. Note that even test points can be regarded as 
an outcome of the school system, and therefore they are not necessarily a perfect measure of 
ability. 
School marks are the grade point average (GPA) based on the mid-term report card in 
year 8, taking all school subjects into account. These marks are acknowledged at the time of 
admission to secondary school and remain unaffected by the competence score, since pupils 
receive a mid-term report card usually in January, while competence scores are measured in 
May. Missing GPA (12 per cent) was replaced either with the available grade in maths or 
Hungarian, or the GPA measured at the end of year 7, or the class average. GPA is reported 
by the school, and is available in NABC as additional information. It is assumed that GPA is 
the major information source for pupils about their school achievement. School marks are 
readily available. Pupils know what grade they have, and moreover pupils (and sometimes 
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also teachers) discuss grades in their classrooms. Therefore pupils might also know the grades 
of their classmates (and therefore their own grade relative to those classmates).  
GPA is derived from NABC (which unlike HLCS asked everybody from the school 
cohort). Therefore the classroom average (in year 8) could also be computed. In order to have 
similar (relative to classmates) measures of self-assessment, the GPA measure appears as a 
classroom average and the individual deviation from that. Therefore, for every individual one 
can calculate the average GPA in the former year 8 classroom, and – by subtracting this 
average from the actual score – individual deviation from that class average. Both variables 
(individual and classroom-average GPA) are standardized with 0 mean and one unit standard 
deviation.  
Competence scores, on the other hand, are used in the analysis to control for unobserved 
ability (which teachers cannot observe, but pupils might have – see Keller, 2015; Terrier, 
2014). This is important, since pupils’ self-estimations might be driven by ability, which is 
not necessarily captured by grades. Test scores in NABC are measured at the end of year 8, 
usually in May. The test itself measures mathematical and reading literacy. This is a written 
test requiring four sessions of 45 minutes. It is completed by pupils in their usual classroom 
environment. In maths, pupils have to think about everyday life problems, to which they are 
required to apply their maths knowledge. In reading, they have to read between six and eight 
1–2 page long texts, after which they are asked questions on what they have read. Since the 
aim of including competence measures (alongside school grades) in the analysis is to control 
for unobserved ability as well as possible, in order not to lose variance, both maths and 
reading comprehension test scores are introduced into the analysis (rather than some form of 
composite measure). Both maths and reading comprehension test scores are standardized to 0 
mean and one unit standard deviation. 
Descriptive statistics about self-assessment, competence scores and school marks (the 
major intendant variables) are summarized in Table 2. Since every measure is standardised 
and have 0 mean and 1 standard deviation (Panel C), one unit corresponds to one standard 
deviation. It means for example that the difference in self-assessment between the offspring of 
low- and high-educated parents is 0.6 unit of standard deviation (Panel D): it is below the 
average (-0.31) among children with low-educated parents (Panel A) and above average 
(0.29) among those with high-educated parents (Panel B). Similar differences can be found in 
school marks and competence test scores. 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
2.3.6. Psychological variables 
 
The way in which pupils rate their own ability could be influenced by some psychological 
traits. In a limited scope, pupils’ personality traits are investigated by HLCS. Rotter’s (1966) 
locus of control scale measures the degree of control that individuals have over their lives. 
While internal control means that a person believes he or she has some control over life, 
external control is defined as when someone considers that environmental factors (or fate) 
influence life outcomes. Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem estimates the overall evaluation of 
one’s worth or value. Harter’s (1982) social competence scores provide information on 
whether a pupil feels an important member of his/her school class. Moreover, a depression 
scale was constructed from questions about anxiety and suicidal thoughts. 
 
2.3.7. Control variables 
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The following control variables were used, though the estimated effects of the variables do 
not appear in the tables: gender (dummy variable, 53 per cent of respondents were male); year 
of birth (introduced as a continuous variable which ranged from 1987 to 1993; the mean value 
was 1991); number of siblings (introduced as a continuous variable, ranging from 0 to 9, with 
1.3 average); birth order (dummy variable indicating who is the first born among siblings); 
respondent is Roma (measuring ethnic minority with a dummy variable, 9.7 per cent of pupils 
in the sample were Roma); type of settlement of residence (four categorical variables: rural, 
town, county seat and capital, introduced in three dummy variables; omitted category is the 
capital); and county of residence (19 dummies). Because the focus of the analysis is not on the 
impact of these variables, tables containing the results do not summarise the estimated 
parameters for these variables.  
 
2.3.8. School fixed effects 
 
If there is a sorting of students across schools, endogeneity might occur, especially since the 
heterogeneity of schools is considered quite remarkable in Hungary (Horn, 2013). Following 
the logic of Falch and Strom (2011), it is easy to assume that pupils/parents select schools in 
order to maximize the peer effect, or that motivated parents send their offspring to schools 
with high teacher quality. The same issue emerges if teachers select a school to work at on the 
basis of its pedagogical programme; thus it is not just pupils, but also teachers that are not 
randomly distributed among schools.  
Even though HLCS is not a school-based survey, school-level information for year 8 
can be merged with it from NABC, and year 9 school IDs are available in HLCS. Throughout 
the main analysis, year 9
 
fixed effects will be used, since it is assumed that the unobserved 
heterogeneity at that school level might bias the results – especially how pupils estimated 
their self-assessment – since this question was asked in year 9. Compared to hierarchical 
models, fixed-effects models are known to be more effective if variance at the higher ordered 
level influences variance at the individual level (Hox, 2010; Snijders and Bosker, 1999), as 
might be the case with school-level unobserved heterogeneity and school achievement or self-
assessment, as discussed above. However, employing school fixed effects also means that 
only within-school variance is used, and the estimated parameters should be interpreted 
relative to the school average in year 9.  
 
2.4. Descriptive 
 
The empirical analysis to be done later is driven by the assumption that, at the same level of 
GPA, those who perceive their abilities to be higher will be more successful in their 
educational transitions than their peers with the same grades but a lower level of self-
assessment. This assumption could be easily validated with some descriptive evidence. Since 
NABC has full information about the classroom attended in year 8 (grades and competence 
scores are recorded for each class member), and since the wording of the self-assessment 
question indicates the hypothetical classroom average, it is possible to anchor self-assessment 
to relative school achievement.  
One possible way of doing this is to check whether grades in year 8
 
fall below or above 
the classroom average (two categories) and compare whether the corresponding self-
assessment is lower or higher than the average indicated in the question (i.e. 70 points – two 
categories again). Combining these two sets of two categories, a four-category classification 
is produced, showing the match and mismatch between school grade and self-assessment. The 
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same could also be done in the case of competence scores; but, since grades are more obvious 
in the classroom (and might often be discussed by peers), the classification is based on school 
grades. However, a corresponding classification based on competence scores is also made, 
and shows the same results. 
Based on this four-category variable called anchored self-assessment, approximately 70 
per cent of pupils estimate their abilities to correspond to their test scores, at least relative to 
the distribution of both variables. For the remaining 30 per cent – where there is some kind of 
mismatch – the combination of above-average grades and below-average self-assessment 
(when pupils underestimate themselves) is more likely than vice versa, when a below-average 
grade goes together with above-average self-perception. In general, for every outcome 
variable analysed in this paper, a higher mean is found among those who have below-average 
school achievement and above-average self-assessment than among those with below-average 
grades and below-average self-assessment. Hence, self-assessment may well increase the 
probability of transition. But the reverse argument holds, too: when above-average school 
achievement is combined with below-average self-assessment, the probability that those 
pupils will choose more knowledge-intensive education is lower than among their peers who 
are above average in terms of both grades and self-assessment.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
2.5. Models 
2.5.1. Parental background differences in self-assessment 
 
When calculating the differences in self-assessment according to parental background, raw 
differences are shown first. These are refined using multivariate fixed-effect ordinary least 
squares (OLS) models, where, in addition to parental background, self-assessment is 
explained by ability, psychological variables, school fixed effects and control variables.  
Eq.1 shows the estimated model, where SA stands for self-assessment, PB for parental 
background, and A is a vector for ability containing school marks and competence scores. P is 
the vector of psychological variables, containing psychological traits like internal control, 
social competence, self-esteem and inclination to depression. C is a vector representing 
individual controls like gender, year of birth, number of siblings, birth order, whether the 
respondent is Roma, plus type of settlement and county of residence. S stands for school fixed 
effects; separate models are fitted using primary and secondary school unobserved school-
level heterogeneity. In the equation ε stands for individual error term. The β-s are the vectors 
of OLS coefficients; and α is the constant in the equation.  
The results appear in Table 3. Throughout this exercise, the focus is on the impact of 
parental background (β1) and how its effect is mediated by additional control variables.  
 
𝑆𝐴 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝑃𝐵 + 𝛽2 × 𝐴 + 𝛽3 × 𝑃 + 𝛽4 × 𝐶 + 𝛽6 × 𝑆 +  𝜀     (Eq.1)  
 
2.5.2. Self-assessment and educational choices, and how self-assessment mediates parental 
education gap in track choices 
 
Mediational analyses try to identify the process whereby a particular independent variable 
leads to a specific outcome for a dependent variable, decomposing the total effect between the 
independent and the dependent variable into direct and indirect effect, which is transmitted 
14 
 
through a third independent variable (Alwin and Hauser, 1975; Hou, 2014). Therefore the 
second research question concerns the differences in educational transitions according to 
parental educational level, and the question to be analysed involves the extent to which self-
assessment mediates these differences.  
Three different dependent variables are employed (descriptive statistics are available in 
Table 1). In the case of transition from primary to secondary education, the dependent 
variable consists of those who were admitted to college-bound secondary tracks (secondary 
general and secondary vocational track) versus those at vocational track. In a second set of 
models, the difference between secondary general and secondary vocational track is analysed. 
In the last set of models, the transition to state-financed tertiary education provides the focus 
of attention. Here, the population contains those who completed secondary education 
(secondary general or secondary vocational track) within five years of commencing it.  
Among the right-hand variables appear self-assessment (SA), parental background (PB), 
ability (A), psychological controls (P), school fixed effects (S) and other individual-level 
control variables (C). Unobserved school heterogeneity deals with the unknown selection of 
pupils into schools, which could also influence self-reported ability (self-assessment). Only 
secondary-school unobserved school heterogeneity is controlled for, since unobserved school 
heterogeneity might influence the way in which pupils answered the self-assessment question. 
In the case of entry to tertiary education, an additional variable appears in the regression, 
indicating the year in which pupils graduated from secondary school (U).  
Testing whether self-assessment mediates the parental education gap in educational 
transitions, the difference in the estimated coefficient of parental background (ß2) will be 
tested in models with (Eq.2) and without (Eq.3) self-assessment.  
 
 
𝑌 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝑆𝐴 + 𝛽2 × 𝑃𝐵 + 𝛽3 × 𝐴 + 𝛽4 × 𝑃 + 𝛽5 × 𝑆 + 𝛽6 × 𝐶 [+ 𝛽7 × 𝑈] + 𝜀   (Eq.2) 
𝑌 = 𝛼 + 𝛽2 × 𝑃𝐵 + 𝛽3 × 𝐴 + 𝛽4 × 𝑃 + 𝛽5 × 𝑆 + 𝛽6 × 𝐶 [+ 𝛽7 × 𝑈] + 𝜀    (Eq.3) 
 
 
2.5.3. The moderation effect of self-assessment in the parental education gap of educational 
transitions 
 
Moderator variables are understood as variables that affect the direction and/or strength of the 
relationship between the independent and the dependent variable (Baron and Kenny, 1986; 
Muller et al., 2005). In that sense, self-assessment moderates the parental educational gap if 
the impact of self-assessment on the track choice differs among the offspring of differently 
educated parents. Statistically, the moderation effect is assessed by the interaction between 
parental educational level and self-assessment. Eq.4 therefore differs from Eq.2 in that it 
contains the interaction term as well. 
 
𝑌 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝑆𝐴 + 𝛽2 × 𝑃𝐵 + 𝛽3 × (𝑃𝐵 × 𝑆𝐴) + 𝛽4 × 𝐴 + 𝛽5 × 𝑃 + 𝛽6 × 𝑆 + 𝛽7 × 𝐶 [+ 𝛽8 × 𝑈] + 𝜀 (Eq.4) 
 
Throughout the analysis, linear probability models are preferred to logit or probit models. 
This is partly because the calculation of marginal effects using conditional non-linear models 
could be biased (Fernández-Val, 2009), and the same problem could arise when calculating 
the interaction effect (Buis, 2010; Norton et al., 2004).  
 
 
 
15 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1. What kind of factors mediate parental education differences in self-assessment 
 
Table 3 shows the results of estimations explaining self-assessment. Column 1 reports the raw 
gap according to parental education between pupils who have parents with and without the 
school-leaving certificate (b = 0.599, p < 0.01). Note, that the numbers in the table are 
expressed relative to the standard deviation of self-assessment which is fixed in one unit. It 
could be established (Column 2) that approximately 40 per cent (1-0.381/0.599) of the 
differences in self-assessment according to parental education are mediated through ability 
differences, which means that pupils with low-educated parents estimate their abilities to be 
lower (since their individual academic achievement is also lower) than do their peers with 
high-educated parents (the difference between the two parameters is significant: F = 117.40, p 
< 0.001).  
Another explanation for this status-related gap in self-assessment is that pupils with 
various parental backgrounds probably attend quite different classrooms. Including 
classroom-level characteristics (like average school marks) (see Column 3), the parental 
education difference in self-assessment decreases further (the difference in the effect of 
parental education between the two parameters in Columns 2 and 3 is significant: F = 170.50, 
p < 0.001). Parental background differences in self-assessment might also be connected to 
unobserved school-level heterogeneity: controlling for year 8 school characteristics (fixed 
effect regression), the gap in self-assessment according to parental education shows a further 
decrease (Column 4). (However, the drop in the effect of parental education between the two 
parameters in Columns 3 and 4 is not significant: F = 0.03, p = 0.86). Furthermore, school 
differences in year 9 have a somewhat higher impact on self-assessment than in year 8 (the 
coefficient in the first row of the table decreases further in Column 5), which means that 
pupils’ reports of self-assessment are more a function of year 9 school characteristics than 
year 8. This serves to underline the reasoning that, depending on the quality of the secondary 
school, pupils might revise their year 8 achievement retrospectively (the drop in the parameter 
of parental education is not significant either between Column 3 and Column 5: F = 0.73, p = 
0.39).  
Psychological traits (as well as other control variables) also mediate the initial parental 
education gap in self-assessment. The correlation between self-assessment and psychological 
variables works in the assumed direction: internal control, self-esteem and social competences 
maintain a positive relationship with self-assessment, while the relationship is negative in the 
case of the depression scale.  
Even after controlling for an extended set of individual, classroom and school-level 
explanatory mechanisms, a remarkably large part of parental background differences (b = 
0.076, p < 0.001) remains unexplained. Throughout the analysis, what follows this residual 
parental education gap in self-assessment is interpreted as the imprint of status-related 
differences in parenting styles (Kaiser and Diewald, 2014; Lareau, 2003) and a consequence 
of different interpretations of ability and effort (Breen, 1999).  
 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
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3.2. How track choices are influenced by self-assessment, and how self-assessment mediates 
parental education differences 
 
Table 4 summarizes the results for the role of self-assessment in educational transitions. In the 
three panels of the table, three different dependent variables appear: the choice (1) between 
college-bound secondary tracks and the vocational track (Panel A), (2) the choice between 
secondary general and secondary vocational track (Panel B) and (3) admission to state-
financed tertiary education versus no tertiary education or no state-financed tertiary education 
(Panel C).  
Self-assessment has a significant positive effect in every model presented. Its impact 
ranges from 0.037 to 0.02 across the models, which means that one standard deviation change 
in self-assessment increases the probability of a pupil choosing a more knowledge-intensive 
educational track by approximately 2–4 percentage points. Even though there are differences 
in the size of the estimated parameter for self-assessment across models in the three different 
panels, these differences are not significant at the 5 per cent level.  
Making predictions from the first model (column 1) in Panel A this means that if we 
have two pupils with low-educated parents the one with average self-assessment has 70.3% 
chance to apply to a college-bound secondary tracks. The same probability calculated for the 
other pupil with one standard deviation higher self-assessment is 73% (the difference between 
the two figures is 0.027). At the same time, if we have two pupils with average self-
assessment the one who is the offspring of high-educated parents have 77.2% chance to apply 
to college bound secondary tracks (the same probability for his peer with low-educated 
parents is 70.2%, and the difference is 0.07). Altogether the impact of self-assessment on 
educational track-choices is small. In the given example, it is approximately one third of the 
effect of parental background. One should, however, also be aware that the meaning of one 
standard deviation increase is 20 points difference on the original 0 to 100 scale (the not 
standardised self-assessment variable). It equals with the change if somebody believes that his 
performance is above (80 points) and not bellow (60 points) the classroom average.  
If we compare the estimated parameters for parental schooling across the two models 
within each panel, it is possible to gain some clue about the importance of self-assessment in 
mediating this gap. The difference in parameters across the two models is only because of the 
inclusion of self-assessment. The gap in track choices according to parental educational 
attainment is always larger in the second model than in the first, and the difference between 
the two models is the mediation effect of self-assessment.  
If pupils with low- and well-qualified parents assessed themselves as equally 
performing, the gap in their educational transitions would decrease by an additional 2.7 per 
cent [(0.072-0.070)/0.072], 3.1 per cent [(0.032-0.031)/0.032] or 2.5 per cent [(0.078-
0.076)/0.078]. However, none of the three figures turn out to be significant at the 5% level. 
This means that, even though self-assessment has an effect in educational transitions, it does 
not mediate parental background differences in educational track choices. So the offspring of 
parents with a different educational level do not follow different school tracks because of their 
self-assessment. 
It should be highlighted that individual-level school marks have a higher impact on the 
choice of whether to embark on further education than does the probably more objective 
ability measure – the competence scores. However, one could also argue that school marks 
are more accurate measures, since they reflect pupils’ performance over a longer time period, 
rather than at one point in time. All in all, both maths and reading comprehension test scores 
play an independent role in the explanations of the outcome variables.  
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[Table 4 about here] 
 
3.3. How self-assessment moderates the parental education gap in educational transitions 
 
Table 5 contains the estimations for the interaction between parental background and self-
assessment. Column 1 shows the choice between college-bound secondary tracks and the 
vocational track. The interaction term is negative (b = -0.051, p<0.01), showing that self-
assessment might moderate the parental education gap in educational transitions. The same 
could be established in the case of the choice between secondary general and secondary 
vocational track; here, however, the interaction term is only partially significant (b = -0.015, 
p<0.1). 
Since it is often difficult to imagine the interaction effect solely on the basis of 
estimated coefficients (Brambor et al., 2005), Figure 2 helps to visualize the predicted 
probabilities of being admitted to a college-bound secondary rather than to the vocational 
track. The gap between pupils with well versus poorly educated parents (in predicted 
probability) shows a decreasing pattern if self-assessment increases and all other variables in 
the models are held at the mean value. In the case of offspring of low-educated parents, the 25 
percentage point difference between having very low and very high self-assessment is 
statistically significant (chi2 = 52.62; p < 0.001). The higher the self-assessment estimated by 
the children of low-educated parents, the higher their probability of entering college-bound 
secondary tracks. In the case of the offspring of those with high-educated parents, self-
assessment seems to make no difference. In other words the results indicate that the gap in the 
transition-probability between pupils with low- and high educated parents decreases if pupils’ 
self-assessment increases. This could mean that, while offspring of high-educated parents are 
almost compelled to go to college-bound secondary tracks, self-assessment might increase the 
transition-probability of pupils who have less advantageous parental backgrounds. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
The results could be also interpreted as a sign that self-assessment helps pupils with 
relatively uneducated parents to take the first step in educational mobility and to choose a 
college-bound secondary tracks instead of a vocational one. Note that these tracks (instead of 
the vocational track) offer the school-leaving certificate that serves as an admission ticket to 
tertiary education. Self-assessment has less of a role to play in moderating the parental 
education gap in more qualitative educational choices at the secondary level (choosing a 
secondary general instead of a secondary vocational track). At the tertiary level (as Column 3 
of Table 5 indicates), however, self-assessment does not have a significant moderating effect 
on the parental education gap, most likely since this stage of transition is a consequence of 
prior educational transitions. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
4. Summary and discussion 
 
Throughout the research it was assumed self-assessment might reinforce the investment in 
effort. If pupils are more confident of their abilities they will probably invest more effort in 
education (Azmat and Iriberri, 2010). At the same time, even small investments (little acorns) 
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could make a significant change (mighty oaks) among pupils with low-educated parents. Note 
that if pupils aim to reach the educational level of their parents, this means the offspring of 
low-educated couples tend to choose secondary tracks that do not lead directly to tertiary 
education. This is, however, a direct way to reproduce social inequality. The results presented 
here indicate that estimating own performance higher might help pupils with less 
advantageous parental background to reach their potential and encourage them to choose 
college-bound secondary school tracks. Consequently, depending on self-assessment, the gap 
decreases in college-bound secondary track choice between the offspring of low-and high-
educated parents. 
 
4.1. Limitations 
 
There are some limitations to the results, which should invite careful reading, above all 
because of the retrospective character of self-assessment. The relationship between self-
assessment and educational track choices at the secondary level is likely to be overestimated 
and is not causal in nature. However, a promising feature of the results is that self-assessment 
influences the choice of tertiary education, which is clearly unaffected by the retrospective 
nature of self-assessment. 
It should also be mentioned that ability and school achievement could both be products 
of self-assessment; therefore an early-childhood measure of self-assessment would be more 
appropriate. The finding that the impact of self-assessment was estimated to be higher in the 
transition to tertiary education also shows that self-assessment could induce later academic 
achievement. The ceiling effect could, however, result in lower estimations. Since self-
assessment is measured on a scale of 0–100, and the hypothetical class average is fixed (70). 
Therefore there may be limited scope for expressing outstanding performance relative to 
classmates. 
 
 
4.2. Conclusion 
 
The choice of secondary education (at age 14) is probably the first educational decision where 
pupils have a say. Self-assessment could therefore be important for pupils if it helps them to 
decide to break away from parental models, follow their own inclinations and opt for more 
demanding education. As has been shown elsewhere, inducing pupils to think that they are 
highly able is more of an ego-centred than a task-centred exercise, and is therefore perceived 
to be a less effective way of developing ability (Nicholls, 1990: 39).  
The results demonstrated in this paper therefore illustrate that in terms of educational 
outcomes and decision-making it might be important to focus more on the rather overlooked 
effort component, than concentrating exclusively on the well-researched ability component.. 
Our knowledge of how effort is influenced by parental background remains very limited. 
Even though there is a growing body of literature pointing out the importance of personality 
traits (though personality traits are not necessarily equivalent to effort) in educational 
outcomes (Borghans et al. 2008), often this does not focus on the connection to family 
background (but see, for example, Heckman 2008 on this issue).  
Making an investment in education is costly, since investment now is only rewarded in 
the uncertain future. As with any investment, there is always the possibility of failure. Hence, 
having something which modifies the willingness of pupils to make the effort is of significant 
importance. Self-assessment – the perceived knowledge about own ability – was found to be 
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the kind of factor which might help to understand who makes the investment in education. If 
somebody believes that he is able (or more able than his peers), that belief might help him to 
consider the effort to be worthwhile. Because of the confidence in own ability, people with 
high self-assessment might worry less about fruitless investment and might endure current 
efforts in order to earn later rewards. Therefore from the little acorn of self-assessment, the 
mighty oaks of reward may grow.  
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Figures 
Figure 1: The mean value of the dependent variables to be used in the analysis by 
anchored self-assessment (mean values with 95 per cent confidence intervals) 
 
 
N=7722.  
Secondary refers to the dependent variable ‘college-bound secondary tracks versus vocational track’; S.General 
refers to the dependent variable ‘secondary general track versus secondary vocational track’; Tertiary refers to 
the dependent variable ‘state-financed tertiary versus no tertiary education’. 
 
 
Figure 2: Different predictions of the choice of college-bound secondary tracks rather 
than the vocational track, according to parental background (based on Model 1 in Table 
5)  
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Tables  
 
Table 1: Mean, standard deviation and number of cases of the three dependent variables 
in analysis, by parental background 
 
 
   Dependent variables used in the analysis  
Parent’s highest 
school 
qualification 
 College-bound 
secondary tracks 
versus 
Vocational track 
Sec. general track 
versus 
Sec. vocational track 
State-financed tertiary 
versus 
No tertiary/not state-fin.  
P
an
el
 
A
 
Low-educated 
parents 
mean 57.93% 21.36% 17.23% 
sd 49.37% 41.00% 37.78% 
N 3,677 2,130 1,126 
P
an
el
 
B
 
High-educated 
parents 
mean 88.45% 45.89% 40.11% 
sd 31.96% 49.84% 49.02% 
N 4,045 3,578 2,533 
P
an
el
 
C
 Total 
mean 73.92% 36.74% 33.07% 
sd 43.91% 48.21% 47.05% 
N 7,722 5,708 3,659 
 
 
Table 2: Mean, standard deviation and number of cases of self-assessment and ability 
measures in year 8, by parental background 
 
 
 Parent’s 
highest 
school 
qualification 
 
Self-
assessment 
School marks  
(year 8) 
Competence test scores  
(year 8) 
Individual  Class average Maths Reading 
P
a
n
el
 
A
 
Low-
educated 
mean -0.31 -0.26 -0.34 -0.40 -0.38 
sd 0.95 0.99 0.94 0.85 0.86 
N 3,677 3,677 3,677 3,677 3,677 
P
a
n
el
 
B
 
High-
educated 
mean 0.29 0.24 0.31 0.37 0.35 
sd 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.99 1.00 
N 4,045 4,045 4,045 4,045 4,045 
P
an
el
 
C
 Total 
mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
sd 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
N 7,722 7,722 7,722 7,722 7,722 
Pane
l D 
Gap (above-
below) 
mean 0.60 0.50 0.64 0.77 0.73 
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Table 3: Explaining self-assessment, school fixed effect OLS coefficients with standard 
errors in parentheses 
 
 
 
Number of model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable 
Self-
assessment 
Self-
assessment 
Self-
assessment 
Self-
assessment 
Self-
assessment 
Self-
assessment 
Parents’ highest school qualification       
Low-educated Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
High-educated 0.599*** 0.381*** 0.116*** 0.112*** 0.097*** 0.076*** 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
School marks (GPA)       
Individual   0.436*** 0.328*** 0.313*** 0.278*** 0.268*** 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Class average    0.128*** 0.122*** 0.094*** 0.085*** 
   (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) 
Competence test scores       
Maths  0.267*** 0.292*** 0.242*** 0.204*** 0.267*** 
  (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) 
Reading  0.044*** 0.042*** 0.024 0.040*** 0.044*** 
  (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
Rotter’s internal control      0.049*** 
      (0.010) 
Harter’s social competence scores      0.073*** 
      (0.021) 
Rosenberg’s self-esteem scale      0.226*** 
      (0.025) 
Depression scale      -0.104** 
      (0.045) 
Other controls No No No No No Yes 
School fixed effects No No No Year 8 Year 9 Year 9 
Constant -0.314*** -0.199*** -0.061*** -0.059*** -0.051*** -27.642 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (31.877) 
Observations 7,722 7,722 7,722 7,722 7,722 7,722 
Adjusted R-squared 0.089 0.267 0.368 0.444 0.387 0.416 
F-stat 759.3*** 1409*** 900.5*** 684.8*** 255.3*** 48.63*** 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Other controls (in vector C) discussed in 2.3.7: male; year of birth; number of siblings; birth order; respondent is 
Roma; type of settlement; county. 
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Table 4: The explanation of track choices, school fixed effect OLS coefficients with standard 
errors in parentheses 
 
 
 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C 
Number of model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Population Year 8 pupil in 2005/06 Year 8 pupil in 2005/06 Finished secondary school 
within 5 years 
Dependent variable College-bound secondary tracks 
(1) versus vocational track (0) 
Sec. general track (1) versus sec. 
vocational track (0) 
State-financed tertiary (1) 
versus no/not state-f. (0) 
Self-assessment 0.027***  0.020***  0.037***  
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.011)  
Parental schooling       
Low-educated Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
High-educated  0.070*** 0.072*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.076*** 0.078*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.018) 
School marks        
Individual  0.085*** 0.093*** 0.029*** 0.036*** 0.069*** 0.082*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) 
Class average  0.054*** 0.057*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.037*** 0.042*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) 
Competence score       
Maths  0.023*** 0.029*** 0.013** 0.018*** 0.053*** 0.060*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.012) 
Reading  0.019*** 0.021*** 0.011* 0.012** 0.042*** 0.044*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) 
Graduated in 2010     Ref. Ref. 
Graduated in 2011     -0.043** -0.040** 
     (0.018) (0.018) 
Graduated in 2012     -0.144** -0.142** 
     (0.069) (0.069) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School fixed effects Year 9 Year 9 Year 9 Year 9 Year 9 Year 9 
Constant -42.683*** -43.514*** 0.701 1.197 -16.584 -16.118 
 (13.914) (13.939) (13.784) (13.807) (30.493) (30.557) 
Observations 7,722 7,722 5,708 5,708 3,570 3,570 
Adjusted R-squared 0.422 0.419 0.733 0.732 0.265 0.262 
F-stat 26.67*** 26.57*** 6.678*** 6.315*** 8.123*** 7.961*** 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Other controls (in vector C) discussed in 2.3.7: male; year of birth; number of siblings; 
birth order; respondent is Roma; type of settlement; county. 
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Table 5: Interactional effects, fixed effect OLS coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable College-bound 
secondary tracks (1) 
versus vocational 
track (0) 
Sec. general track 
(1) versus sec. 
vocational track (0) 
State-financed 
tertiary (1) versus 
no/not state-f. (0) 
Self-assessment 0.051*** 0.028*** 0.019 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.016) 
Parental schooling    
Low-educated Ref. Ref. Ref. 
High-educated 0.067*** 0.032*** 0.069*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.019) 
Self-assessment×Parental schooling    
Low-educated Ref. Ref. Ref. 
High-educated -0.051*** -0.015* 0.028 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.019) 
School marks     
Individual  0.085*** 0.029*** 0.069*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) 
Class average  0.055*** 0.017*** 0.037*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) 
Competence score    
Maths  0.025*** 0.014** 0.052*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.013) 
Reading  0.020*** 0.011* 0.042*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) 
Graduated in 2010    
Graduated in 2011   -0.042** 
   (0.018) 
Graduated in 2012   -0.141** 
   (0.069) 
Constant -39.439*** 1.516 -17.273 
 (13.892) (13.789) (30.490) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
School fixed effects Year 9 Year 9 Year 9 
Observations 7,722 5,708 3,570 
Adjusted R-squared 0.424 0.733 0.266 
F-stat 26.99*** 6.575*** 7.958*** 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Other controls (in vector C) discussed in 2.3.7: male; year of birth; number of siblings; birth order; respondent is 
Roma; type of settlement; county.   
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Appendix  
 
Figure A1: Schematic overview of Hungarian educational system 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2: Schematic overview of Hungarian Life Course Survey 
 
 
